نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Information asymmetry among banks, depositors, and shareholders can generate principal-agent problems and conflicts of interest in banking profit allocation. This study structurally assesses the interactions among these stakeholders and examines evidence consistent with principal-agent problems in Iran’s banking system. Two structural vector autoregression models based on the Blanchard–Quah (BQ-SVAR) approach are estimated for 21 Iranian banks over 2006–2023 using dividends paid to shareholders, profits paid to depositors, and banks’ shares of pooled revenues (including Wakalah fees). A positive shock to the bank’s share of pooled revenues is associated with a decline in depositor profits, an empirical pattern consistent with a principal-agent conflict in profit allocation. Under the alternative structural restrictions that prioritize depositor profits over shareholder profits, the negative response declines from 0.51 percent to 0.42 percent in the short run and from 2.05 percent to 1.17 percent in the long run. By contrast, the estimated specifications and sample period provide no statistically significant evidence of a principal-agent problem in the relationship between bank management and shareholders. The findings underscore the importance of revising governance and oversight mechanisms for profit distribution, enhancing transparency in the calculation of banks’ shares of pooled revenues, and strengthening mechanisms for protecting depositors’ rights in Iran’s banking system.
کلیدواژهها English